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Abstract
Consider a variation on the classic Weitzman search problem, in which com-
peting firms can choose how much information about their product to reveal to a
consumer. If there are no search frictions, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium
in pure strategies; and for any market of finite size, the firms are not fully infor-
mative. With search frictions, if the expected value of the prize is sufficiently high,
there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which firms are fully informative. Re-
markably, a small search cost leads to the perfect competition level of information
provision–consumers gain when firms are forced to compete on information.
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1 Introduction
This study explores information provision in a problem of sequential search. In par-
ticular, we focus on the classic “Weitzman” search problem, as described in Weitzman
(1979) [29]. An agent faces a number of boxes, each containing some unknown random
prize whose distribution is known to the agent. Time is discrete and each period, the
agent may investigate or inspect any box that she chooses. She may only investigate
one box per time interval, and each box has a (possibly random) search cost as well as
a search time associated with the inspection of its contents. Having investigated a box,
the agent always may return to choose the prize contained within.
We assume the classic setup, in which an agent must inspect a box before she can
claim it.1 Consequently, the agent has two decisions to make: she must decide in which
order to sample the boxes, and she must decide when to stop. From [29], the solution
to this problem takes a simple form. Each box is assigned a value, a reservation price
characteristic to that box alone, and the agent simply inspects the highest value box first,
then the next highest value box, etc. If at any time the agent has already investigated a
box with a reward higher than the highest value of the remaining boxes, the agent stops
the search and the decision problem is over.
We extend this problem by endowing the boxes themselves with agency. As in the
canonical problem, each box has an exogenous, commonly known distribution over its
reward, search cost, and search time. However, now the boxes are not forced to fully
reveal their contents upon inspection by the agent. Instead, each box commits before
knowing its reward to a signal or experiment, the results of which the agent observes
during inspection. The agent is a rational Bayesian, and so updates her beliefs about
the contents of the box after her visit. Importantly, she observes the experiment (but
not the realization) chosen by each box before commencing search.2 Naturally, each box
wants to be selected and chooses a signal that maximizes the probability of it being
1Perhaps surprisingly, this assumption is non-trivial, as illustrated in the recent paper by Doval
(2017) [9].
2The problem in [29] can be seen as the special case where the signal designed by each box is fully
revealing.
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selected, given an optimal search procedure by the agent.
Consider the following example. A consumer wants to buy a good of uncertain
quality and the several sellers carrying it do not compete on price. It is costly for the
consumer to visit a seller, but visiting a seller can be helpful: each seller can choose to
reveal information about the product to the consumer upon her visit. One particular
manifestation of this could be stores that allow the consumer to “try the product” in
the store, versus stores that do not: the former would correspond to a more informative
experiment than the latter. In particular, this model can be used to (at least partially)
explain why car dealerships in the US offer test drives, why primary schools have open
houses, or why clothing stores allow people to try clothes on. Alternatively, as pointed
out by Au [2], the scenario may be interpreted as modeling the design of product varieties.
Consumers and firms are unsure of consumers’ match values with a product, and a
(costly) visit helps consumers discover this. Hence, this scenario poses the question as
to how competing firms should design distributions over product designs optimally.
For simplicity, we restrict attention to the scenario in which each of the n boxes
contains a random prize of either high or low quality, where the probability of high
quality, µ > 0, is the same for each box. Without loss of generality, we normalize the
values of the low- and high-quality prize to the risk-neutral searcher as 0 and 1, so µ is
the expected value of the prize under the prior probability of high quality. Hence, the
problem of experiment design for the boxes is equivalent to one where the boxes choose
any distribution supported on a subset of [0, 1] such that expected value of the prize
under this distribution is µ.
In the ensuing analysis we distinguish between the frictionless case and the case with
frictions. That is, in the general model of Weitzman search, the searcher must pay
some cost c ≥ 0 to inspect a box, and is impatient, discounting the future by some
positive β ≤ 1. Accordingly, the frictionless case refers to the situation where β = 1 and
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c = 0.3 Without frictions, a unique fair4 symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies exists;
and crucially, for any finite n the optimal experiment design is not fully informative.
However, as the number of boxes becomes infinitely large, the equilibrium converges to
one in which each box uses a fully informative signal. This can be thought of as the
Perfect Competition level of information provision.
If instead there are frictions–there is some nonzero cost of inspecting a box and/or
the searcher is relatively impatient–the equilibrium structure is different. If the mean
is sufficiently high, µ ≥ 1 − (1/n)1/(n−1), then the unique symmetric equilibrium is for
each box to choose a fully informative signal (Theorem 4.1). There is no profitable
deviation from the fully-informative distribution since any deviation would ensure that
the deviating box be visited last. Then, since the mean (or equivalently the probability
of low quality under the prior) is so high, the probability of the deviating box being
visited by the searcher, and hence being selected, is also low.
Furthermore, for any possible value of µ, there is no symmetric pure strategy equilib-
rium in which boxes each choose a signal that is not fully informative. There is always a
profitable deviation in which a box can be slightly more informative and thereby ensure
that it is visited first, earning it a discrete jump in its payoff. However, if the mean is
too low then there is no symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies, since there is a prof-
itable deviation from the vector of fully informative signals. In spite of this, we show in
Theorem 2.8 that a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium must exist.
We finish by comparing the searcher’s welfare in the cases with and without search
frictions (Theorem 5.1). Remarkably, for any finite number of boxes n (and for suffi-
ciently high µ), a small cost c > 0 is actually welfare improving for a searcher and leads
to the perfect competition level of information provision. In this model of search, the
boxes compete with information, not price and crucially they choose what information
3Alternatively, instead of interpreting the scenario with β = 1 and c = 0 as the frictionless case,
we could think of this case as one in which the searcher sees all of the signals simultaneously. This
interpretation would also lend support to our focus on fair subgame perfect equilibria.
4Defined formally infra. Essentially, the fair assumption imposes that Pandora randomize uniformly
when she is indifferent.
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the searcher will receive before she starts her search. Because there is a search cost,
the choice of the order in which to visit the boxes becomes paramount. Hence, frictions
force sellers to compete on the order in which they are searched, and that additional
competition benefits the searcher. She receives more information, which makes it more
likely that she selects the box with the highest realized quality.
Another way that we can think about these two scenarios is as a comparison of
search where the consumer has to visit a seller (at cost) in order to see the signal
realization about the product versus the situation where all of the signal realizations
arrive simultaneously for free. Think of, for instance, shopping for a product in person
in contrast to using a comparison website to shop. The results of this paper suggest
that for the consumer, there could be a downside to having the information immediately
available at her fingertips. Furthermore, this interpretation lends further support to our
stipulation of a fair tie breaking rule. With all of the signal realizations on a screen, it
is reasonable to suppose (via some sort of Laplacian “Principle of Insufficient Reason”
argument) that the one the consumer will look at first will be random.
1.1 Related Work
The paper closest in content to this paper is “Competitive Information Disclosure in
Search Markets” (Board and Lu (2017)) [5]. There, the authors examine the case of a
collection of sellers competing to persuade a prospective buyer to purchase one of their
products. Each seller has the same set of products to sell and designs an experiment
in order to sway the buyer’s opinion on the product. In contrast to our paper, buyers
pick a seller at random; and moreover, the state of the world upon which the searchers’
utility depends is common. Here, the information provided by each box provides the
searcher with no information about the contents of any of the other boxes.
Another close related paper is “Competition over Agents with Boundedly Rational
Expectations” (Spiegler (2006)) [27]. The unique equilibrium in that paper is essen-
tially isomorphic to the specific case in the frictionless model when the mean is fixed
at 1/2. Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015) [6] and Albrecht (2017) [1] each derive results
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that characterize the the two-player solution to this problem of (frictionless) competi-
tive information provision. Other papers that look at competitive information provision
include Koessler, Laclau, and Tomala (2017) [21]; Boleslavsky and Cotton (2016) [7];
and a pair of papers by Au and Kawai (2017) [3, 4]. In the second of these papers, [4],
the authors show that in the competitive persuasion setting (equivalent to the friction-
less case in this paper), the first order statistic of the n− 1 other players’ distributions
has the linear form implied by our characterization of the equilibrium. They also show
that each player’s distribution has no point masses, except possibly on 1, and that in
the limit each player chooses the prior distribution (full information revelation). Garcia
(2017) [15], goes beyond the basic competitive persuasion environment, and looks at
the optimal policies for sellers in a frictionless search market who can compete both on
information provision and price.
Note that this idea of competitive persuasion concerns a different sort of competition
than that featured in Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017, 2017) [17, 18], or Norman and
Li (2017) [23]. In those problems, the persuaders inhabit the same common state and
independently choose experiments to convey information about this common state. In
contrast, the boxes here each present information about their own i.i.d. draws, and not
some common state. In addition, this idea of information provision as the choice of a
Blackwell experiment is also used in, among others, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2010) [16];
Kolotilin, Mylovanov, Zapechelnyuk, and Li (2017) [22]; and Perez and Skreta (2017)
[24].
There are a number of papers in the search literature that bear mentioning as well. In
particular, the vein of research that focuses on obfuscation is relevant. Two such papers
are Ellison and Wolitzky (2009) [12] and Ellison and Ellison (2009) [11]. In the first, the
authors extend the model of Stahl (1989) [28] by allowing firms to choose the length of
time it takes for consumers to learn its price. Allowing for such delays hurts consumers,
since obfuscation leads to longer search times and higher prices. Ellison and Ellison, in
turn, provide empirical evidence suggesting that as technology has made price search
easier for consumers, firms have responded by taking actions that make price search
more difficult.
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More recently, Gamp and Kra¨hmer (2017) [14] examine a scenario in which sellers can
dupe naive consumers into buying products that are lemons. As in this model (though
through a different mechanism), search frictions can be beneficial to consumers. Choi,
Dai and Kim (2016) [8] incorporate price competition into a model of Weitzman search
and show, among other things, that a reduction in search cost can lead to an increase
in price. Lastly, Perez-Richet (2012) [25] considers a model in which candidates can
choose whether to disclose information in order to convince a decision maker to adopt
their product.
After an earlier draft of this paper [30] was posted on ArXiv, another paper, Au
(2018) [2], that looks at the identical problem of information provision in the context of
Weitzman search, was posted as a working paper. There the author looks at competition
as an stimulus for dispersion in product designs. Au establishes some further results
(beyond those in this paper) concerning properties of the mixed strategy equilibrium,
and is able to explicitly characterize a mixed-strategy equilibrium for a sufficiently high
outside value. Au also includes novel comparative statics results that center on the
boxes’ welfare as affected by the various environmental parameters.
This paper is the first to look at the Weitzman search problem as an information
provision problem for the boxes themselves. The simple form of the model allows for
tractability and clean results. The main contribution of the paper–that introduction
of a slight search cost leads to the perfect competition level of information provision–is
novel in the literature.
2 The Model
This game consists of n + 1 players; one agent, P (Pandora), and n ex ante identical
boxes indexed by i. Each box has a random quality to the consumer of either 0 or 1, and
µ is the probability of the quality being 1. We call this prior G0 and impose that each
boxes quality is independent. In addition, a pair of inspection costs, (c, β), is associated
with each box. Pandora’s utility function uP (·) is linear in a box’s quality.
Each box has a compact metric space of signal realizations S. Prior to learning its
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quality, each box chooses a signal, Borel measurable function pii :
{
0, 1
} → ∆(S), and
has the power of full commitment to the signal. For any box i, each signal realization si
leads to a posterior distribution Gsi ∈ ∆
({
0, 1
})
with the corresponding posterior mean
µsi . Accordingly, the signal leads to a distribution over posterior means, τi ∈ ∆(µsi) .
We impose that Pandora’s reservation value or outside option is 0, and that the
search costs c and β are sufficiently low that Pandora finds it optimal to search i.e.
βµ > c. Pandora, before embarking on her search, observes the signal (or experiment)
chosen by each of the boxes. Accordingly, she knows how informative each box has
decided to be about its contents before she decides whom to visit. When Pandora visits
a box, she observes the signal realization, and updates her prior as to the (expected)
value of the prize within the box.
Lemma 2.1. Each box’s problem is equivalent to one in which each box chooses a dis-
tribution Fi supported on [0, 1] with mean µ.
Proof. It is a standard result in the literature (see e.g. [16]) that the choice of signal
provision by a box is one of choosing a feasible distribution of posterior means. Elton
and Hill [13] define this set of feasible distributions for a given prior G0 as the set of
“Fusions” of distribution G0, F(G0). Proposition 3.13 in [13] illustrates that if G0 is a
Bernoulli distribution, then this set, F(G0), is the set of all distributions on [0, 1] with
mean µ. Henceforth, we call this set M(µ).
We stipulate box i’s utility in the game to be the probability that it is the box
selected when Pandora chooses to stop searching and select a box. Accordingly, this
game is a constant sum game: the payoffs of all the boxes sum to 1.
Definition 2.2. Given a Bernoulli prior with mean µ, the set of Pure Strategies for
each box is the set of distributions supported on [0, 1] with mean µ. That is, a pure
strategy for box i consists of a choice of distribution Fi ∈M(µ).
The set of mixed strategies is defined as expected:
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Definition 2.3. The set of Mixed Strategies, Σi, is the set of all Borel probability
distributions over the pure strategies of box i:
Σi =
{
σi : M(µ)→ [0, 1]|M(µ)|
∣∣ ∑
Fi∈M(µ)
σi(Fi) = 1
}
A typical element σi ∈ Σi is a Borel probability distribution over the (compact and
equipped with a metric) set M(µ) of box i’s pure strategies.
The timing of the game is
1. Each box simultaneously chooses a mixed strategy σi ∈ Σi.
2. For each box, the outcome of the randomization over pure strategies is realized.
3. Pandora observes each distribution over prizes Fi and chooses an optimal policy,
η, which consists of a selection rule dictating the order in which she should inspect
the boxes, and a stopping rule deciding when she should stop searching.
2.1 Pandora’s Problem
Given the choice of distributions by each of the boxes, Pandora is faced with n boxes,
each containing an expected rewardXi distributed according to a probability distribution
function Fi, which is an endogenous choice of box i. The seminal result of Weitzman
([29]) was to show that each box can be fully characterized by its reservation price:
Definition 2.4. The reservation price of a box i is zFi , where zFi is defined as
zFi = −c+ β
[ ∫ zFi
−∞
zFidFi +
∫ ∞
zFi
xidFi
]
Given this definition, Weitzman ([29]) proved the following proposition:
Proposition 2.5. An optimal (pure strategy) policy, η, or “Pandora’s Rule” ([29]), is
completely characterized by the following two rules:
1. Selection Rule: If a box is to be visited and examined, it should be the closed box
with the highest reservation price.
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2. Stopping Rule: Search should be stopped whenever the maximum reservation
price of the uninspected boxes is lower than the maximum sampled reward, w.
Note that at each point in Pandora’s search we can partition the set of boxes, B, into
opened and unopened boxes, O and U , respectively. Hence, w is given formally as
w = max
i∈O∪0
xi
Let F be the Cartesian product, F :=
∏
i Fi. Given a vector of mixed strategies
σ−i ∈ Σ−i by the other boxes and an optimal policy η(F) by Pandora, box i’s expected
payoff from choosing mixed strategy σi is
E
[
ui
(
σi, σ−i; η(F)
)]
= Pr
(
Box i is chosen |σi, σ−i, η(F)
)
Of course, there is a pressing issue yet to be resolved: there are two natural occasions
in Pandora’s search at which she may be indifferent, and we have to determine a rule in
order to resolve this indifference. The rule we find the most sensible is one of fairness;
that at these points of indifference Pandora randomizes fairly over the boxes responsible
for the indifference. In order to express this precisely, we introduce some helpful notation.
Define U∗ as the set of boxes that induce the maximal z value of all of the boxes in U :
U∗ :=
{
i ∈ U : zi ≥ zj∀j ∈ U
}
Additionally, define O∗ as the set of boxes whose sampled reward is equal to the maxi-
mum sampled reward:
O∗ :=
{
i ∈ O : xi = w
}
Definition 2.6. We call a policy, η, Fair if
1. Whenever U∗ is not a singleton, Pandora visits each member of U∗ next with equal
probability; and
2. Whenever O∗ is not a singleton, Pandora selects each member of O∗ with equal
probability.
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Then, in Fair Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, given Pandora’s optimal fair policy, η,
each box must choose a signal in order to maximize the chance that it is chosen by
Pandora, given the optimal signals by the other boxes. Formally,
Definition 2.7. A mixed strategy Fair Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (FSPE) con-
sists of a policy, η∗, for the searcher and a vector of strategies for the boxes, Σ∗, such
that
1. Pandora chooses a Fair optimal policy:
(a) P ’s optimal policy, η∗(F), satisfies uP (η∗(F)) ≥ uP (η′(F)) ∀ η′; and
(b) P ’s optimal policy is Fair.
2. For each box i, E[ui(σ∗i , σ−i; η∗)] ≥ E[ui(σ′i, σ−i; η∗)] ∀ σ′i ∈ Σi.
Having fully established what Pandora will do upon seeing the signal choices by
the boxes, we can work backward and focus our attention on the strategic interaction
between the boxes.5
Because the game is discontinuous, the existence of equilibria isn’t immediately ev-
ident. Results developed in Reny (1999) [26] allow us to derive the following theorem;
though, as we show later on, there is not generally an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Theorem 2.8. A fair subgame perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies always exists.
Proof. We present a sketch of the proof here, with further detail left to Appendix A.1.
This existence result holds for a general prior, not merely one with binary support.
First, the strategy set for each box is quite well-behaved: the set of pure strategies
and the set of mixed strategies are both compact, convex, and Hausdorff. Second,
because the game is constant sum–recall that the payoff for each box i is simply the
probability that it is selected at the end of Pandora’s search–the game is reciprocally
upper-semicontinuous. As intuitively described in [26], “whenever some player’s payoff
5Henceforth we use FSPE, SPE, equilibrium, and subgame perfect equilibrium interchangeably–to
refer to this idea of FSPE.
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jumps down, some other player’s payoff jumps up.” Third, the mixed extension of the
game is payoff secure. In fact, we show a stronger condition–one that obviously implies
payoff security–that each box’s payoff is lower-semicontinuous in the other boxes’ mixed
strategies. The properties of reciprocal upper-semicontinuity and payoff security ensure
there is a mixed strategy equilibrium.
We wish to remark here that this existence result is relatively independent of our cho-
sen tie-breaking rule (the “fairness” restriction). For instance, we could allow Pandora
to “prefer” any of the sellers by visiting them with a probability greater than 1/n when
indifferent, which would not affect the mechanics of the proof. It is in the frictionless
case that the fairness assumption has bite–there it serves to exclude a certain portion of
the set of symmetric equilibria.
3 Frictionless Search
We begin with the case where the inspection cost, c, is equal to 0, and the discount rate
for the searcher, β, is equal to 1. We call this frictionless search. Alternatively, this
can be thought of the situation in which Pandora observes all of the signal realizations
simultaneously. Indeed, this interpretation lends itself naturally to the focus on fair
equilibria.
If c = 0 and β = 1, then this scenario is equivalent one in which a mean µ ∈ [0, 1] is
fixed, and the boxes each choose a random variable distributed on [0, 1] with the given
mean. The winner of the game is the player whose random variable has the highest
realization.
We have the following proposition (with proof left to Appendix B.1):
Lemma 3.1. (Frictionless) There are no symmetric equilibria with point masses on
any point in the interval [0, 1).
The mechanics behind this result are clear. There can be no mass points on any point
other than 1 since a box can always deviate by moving its mass point infinitesimally
higher and achieving a discrete jump in its payoff. We can quickly gain some intuition for
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this result by thinking about the symmetric vector of strategies where each box chooses
a fully informative signal. Any box can deviate profitably by instead putting some µ− 
( small) weight on 1 and 1−µ+  weight on some strictly positive point (very) close to
0. Since  is so small, this deviation will “cost” the deviator next to nothing, but since
the probability that all the other boxes all have a realization of 0 is strictly positive, the
deviator will have secured itself a discrete jump up in its payoff.
Next, we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium:
Theorem 3.2. (Frictionless)
• If µ ≥ 1/n then the unique symmetric equilibrium is for each box to play F ∗,
defined as
F ∗(x) = (1− a)
(
x
s
)1/(n−1)
for x ∈ [0, s]
where a = µ− µ(1− a)n and s = nµ(1− a)n−1; and Pr(X = 1) = a.
• If µ < 1/n then the unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium is for each box
to play strategy F ∗ =
(
x
nµ
)1/(n−1)
supported on [0, nµ].
Proof. We present a sketch of the proof, with further detail left to Appendix B.2. Show-
ing this formulation constitutes an equilibrium is simple: direct calculation allows us to
verify that there is no profitable deviation. Establishment of uniqueness proceeds in two
steps. First, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3.3. (Frictionless) Suppose that in a symmetric equilibrium each box puts a
point mass of size a ≥ 0 on 1. Then, a must satisfy a ≥ µ[1− (1− a)n].
If the mean is sufficiently high, then any symmetric equilibrium must have a point
mass on 1, since otherwise a box could deviate profitably by choosing a fully informative
signal. Against boxes choosing strategies without point masses on 1, a box playing the
prior would be selected for sure after the high realization, and so if the high realization
is sufficiently likely, the other boxes need to take steps to thwart this.
13
In the second step, we can solve for the equilibrium strategy directly, using optimal
control techniques. We fix a vector of strategies, H, for the n−1 other boxes: H := F n−1j .
Given H, we define the functional J [fi] as the Euler-Lagrange equation
J [fi] =
∫ s
t
fi(x)H(x)dx− λ0
[ ∫ s
t
fi(x)dx− (1− a)
]
− λ
[ ∫ s
t
xfi(x)dx− µ+ a
]
The first constraint ensures the distribution satisfies Kolmogorov’s second axiom,
and the second constraint guarantees that the expectation is µ. Box i simply solves this
maximization problem. We finish by generating some smaller auxiliary results that are
needed in order to pin down the support of Fi.
As evinced by our next result, competition has a clear effect on information provision
in the frictionless case.
Theorem 3.4. (Frictionless) Let µ > 1/n. If the number of boxes is increased, the
weight placed on 1 in the symmetric equilibrium must increase. That is, a is strictly
increasing in n.
In the limit, as the number of boxes, n, becomes infinitely large, the weight on 1
converges to µ. That is, the equilibrium distribution converges to a distribution with
support on two points, 1 and 0.
Proof. For convenience, define b = 1− a, and recall (see Theorem 3.2) that we have
µ =
1− b
1− bn
Define the right hand side of this expression as ϕ. For b ∈ [0, 1], ϕ is decreasing in b
and therefore increasing in a over the same interval. Moreover, we make take the partial
derivative with respect to n:
∂ϕ
∂n
=
(1− b)bn ln(b)
(bn − 1)2 < 0
Thus, as n increases, the a needed to satisfy the above expression must increase.
That is, more and more weight is put on 1. Concurrently, s, or the upper bound of
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Figure 1: Effect of n on s and a at Equilibrium for µ = 1/2
the continuous portion of the distribution is shrinking, since, (as shown in the proof of
Theorem 3.2)
s =
n(µ− a)
1− a
and thus
∂s
∂a
=
−n(1− µ)
(1− a)2
Furthermore, as n goes to infinity, we see that a goes to µ.
An illustration of the relationship between n and the symmetric equilibrium values
of a and s is given in Figure 1.
4 Search with Frictions
We turn our attention to the case where c > 0 and/or 0 < β < 1. In the following
result we establish sufficient conditions for there to be a symmetric equilibrium in pure
strategies.
Theorem 4.1. (Frictions) Suppose there are frictions, i.e. c > 0 and/or β < 1. If
µ ≥ 1−(1/n)1/(n−1) then the unique symmetric equilibrium is one in which each box uses
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a fully revealing signal. For any fixed µ ∈ (0, 1), there is some N such that if the number
of boxes n is greater than or equal to N , there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in
pure strategies, where each box chooses a fully informative signal.
Proof. We establish the result through the following two lemmata:
Lemma 4.2. (Frictions) The reservation value assigned by P to a box with a fully
revealing signal is strictly higher than the reservation value assigned to a box with any
other signal. Equivalently, if Fi ∈M(µ) and Fi 6= G0 then zG0 > zFi.
Proof. With a binary prior,
zG0 =
βµ− c
1− β(1− µ)
Consider any distribution Fi 6= G0, Fi ∈ M(µ) such that
∫ 1
zFi
xdFi(x) = µ. Since
Fi 6= G0, we must have F (zFi) = k(1− µ) < (1− µ), for some 1 > k ≥ 0. Then,
zFi =
βµ− c
1− kβ(1− µ) (1)
Expression 1 is strictly increasing in k and thus
zFi =
βµ− c
1− kβ(1− µ) <
βµ− c
1− β(1− µ) = zG0
Next, consider any distribution Hi 6= G0, Hi ∈ M(µ) such that
∫ 1
zHi
xdHi(x) = tµ,
for some 0 < t < 1. Since Hi 6= G0, we must have 1− tµ ≥ F (zHi) > 0. We have
zHi =
tβµ− c
1− βF (zHi)
(2)
Expression 2 is strictly increasing in F (zHi), which is bounded above by 1− tµ and thus
zHi =
tβµ− c
1− βF (zHi)
≤ tβµ− c
1− β(1− tµ) <
βµ− c
1− β(1− µ) = zG0
where we used the fact that
(
tβµ− c)/(1− β(1− tµ)) is strictly increasing in t.
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For a general prior, zG0 ≥ zFi for any Fi that is a mean-preserving contraction of G0;
which is intuitively clear6 since G0 is more informative in the Blackwell sense than any
Fi. However, the fact that the reservation value assigned to the prior is strictly higher
than for any other garbling relies on the binary prior assumption. Indeed, it does not
hold in general for a prior with any other support.7
Lemma 4.3. (Frictions) If µ ≥ 1− (1/n)1/(n−1), then a symmetric vector of distribu-
tions is an equilibrium if and only if each distribution induces the maximal reservation
value, zG0.
Proof. Suppose there is a symmetric equilibrium in which each box chooses a distribu-
tion, Hi that induces some zHi < zG0 . Suppose that box 1 deviates and instead chooses
distribution Fi ∈ M(µ) (Fi 6= G0, and Fi 6= Hi), such that
∫ 1
zFi
xdFi(x) = µ. In other
words, the mass of this distribution below its reservation value consists entirely of a
point mass on 0. Since Fi 6= G0, we must have F (zFi) = k(1 − µ) < (1 − µ), for some
1 > k ≥ 0. Then,
zFi =
βµ− c
1− kβ(1− µ) (3)
Expression 3 is strictly and smoothly increasing in k and thus there is some kˆ such
that for all k > kˆ, zFi > zHi . Moreover, under this distribution it is clear that Pr
(
Xi >
zFi
) ≥ Pr (Xi > zHi) > 1/n. Thus, box 1 has achieved a profitable deviation. Note that
for any 1 > k ≥ 0 it is easy to construct a corresponding Fi.
If each box chooses G0 then there is no profitable deviation, since any deviation will
induce a strictly lower z. That box will be visited last, and its payoff will be at most
(1− µ)n−1 ≤ 1/n, by assumption.
Combining the two lemmata yields Theorem 4.1.
6And proved as a lemma in Appendix C.1.
7A simple example of different fusions of a ternary prior that induce the maximal reservation value
may be found in Appendix C.2.
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If the mean is sufficiently high, then it becomes paramount for a box to choose an
experiment that entices Pandora into visiting it first. Since there are search costs, Pan-
dora’s rule dictates that she visit more informative boxes first. Hence, in any proposed
symmetric equilibrium other than the fully informative one, a box can deviate by choos-
ing a distribution with a slightly higher reservation value, thereby ensuring that it is
the first box visited. As a result of this incentive, there is an unraveling upwards to
the distribution that induces the maximal reservation value, which is uniquely the prior
distribution. Because the mean is so high, there can be no profitable deviation from
the fully informative equilibrium. Crucially, any box that deviates from the fully infor-
mative equilibrium will guarantee that it is visited last. Then, because the mean–and
equivalently the chance of a high realization under the fully informative signal–are so
high, even though a deviating box can ensure that if it is visited it will be selected, the
likelihood that Pandora ever visits that box is too low for the deviation to be profitable.
If, however, the mean, µ, is strictly below the cutoff (µ < 1− (1/n)1/(n−1)) then this
logic fails, since it is insufficiently likely that the box is of high quality. As in the high
mean case, because of the incentive to be visited first, there cannot be a symmetric pure
strategy equilibrium in which boxes are anything less than fully informative. However,
because the mean is so low, there is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium in which
each box is fully informative. There, the likelihood that the deviating box will be visited
is sufficiently high to ensure that the deviation is profitable. Indeed, we have
Theorem 4.4. (Frictions) Suppose the prior distribution has support on 0 and 1 and
let the mean satisfy µ < 1 − (1/n)1/(n−1). Then there is no symmetric equilibrium in
pure strategies.
Proof. We sketch the proof (with formal detail left to Appendix C.3).
First, there can be no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium in which boxes play
distributions with any zFi < zG0 . A box can always deviate by choosing a distribution
that is almost identical but which induces a slightly higher z. In doing so, the deviating
box ensures that it will be inspected first, securing itself a first-order increase in its payoff
(whereas any potential decrease in payoff resulting from the change in distribution will
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be second-order).
Second, because the mean is so low, there can be no equilibrium in which each box
chooses the fully informative signal, since a box could deviate profitably to, say, a fully
uninformative signal, and achieve a higher payoff.
We can derive the following result regarding the symmetric mixed strategy equilib-
rium. We say that there is an induced mass point on a reservation value z if there is a
set of distributions that induce z that is played with positive probability.
Proposition 4.5. (Frictions) There is no symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in
which there is an induced mass point a > 0 on any reservation value z 6= zG0.
Proof. Recall that zG0 is the reservation value induced uniquely by a fully informative
signal. The intuition behind this proof is similar to that for Theorem 4.4. Any box i
can deviate profitably by instead inducing a mass point on a slightly higher reservation
value. In a sense this can be thought of an identical mixed strategy where the “ties are
broken in box i’s favor”.
The detailed proof is included in Appendix C.4.
This result arises as a consequence of the same sort of logic that dictates that sellers
choose atomless distributions over prices in situations where their competitors can un-
dercut, see e.g. [28]. In our scenario, if there were a point mass on any reservation value
other than the maximal reservation value, another box could “overcut” with information,
and discretely increase its payoff.
Precise characterization of the mixed strategy equilibrium is a challenge. The utility
of a box as a function of the vector of mixed strategies is quite complicated, due to
the nature of Pandora’s stopping procedure. Even for the situation with just two boxes
it is rather ungainly (see the proof of Lemma A.7, for the utilities in explicit form).
Another difficulty lies in the set of pure strategies over which the boxes are mixing.
That set–M(µ), the set of all probability distributions on [0, 1] with mean µ–is quite
large, and the objective of solving each box’s respective maximization problem over this
set has proved elusive. In a subsequent working paper building on this one, Au (2018)
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[2] establishes some further properties that the mixed strategy must have. Moreover, he
characterizes explicitly a mixed strategy equilibrium for the case where the searcher has
a high outside option. This assumption allows for a simpler formulation of the boxes’
problem, enabling the result. For an outside option below this cutoff, that equilibrium;
however, is not an generally an equilibrium.
5 Dynamics and Welfare Comparisons
We now derive the main result and contribution of the paper. Namely, we show how an
increase in search costs can increase the welfare of the consumer.
5.1 Welfare Comparisons
Next, we compare the equilibria in the cases without and with search frictions.
5.1.1 The Case without Frictions
Let µ ≥ 1/n. If c = 0, and β = 1, then from Theorem 3.2, the unique symmetric
equilibrium is for each box to choose distribution F ∗, defined as
F ∗(x) = (1− a)
(
x
s
)1/(n−1)
for x ∈ [0, s]
where a = µ − µ(1 − a)n and s = nµ(1 − a)n−1; and Pr(X = 1) = a. Moreover,
Pandora’s payoff from this search can be described as the random variable Z = maxj[Xj].
With probability 1 − (1 − a)n, Z takes value 1. Moreover, Z has a continuous portion
H(z) supported on [0, s]:
H(z) =
(
F ∗
)n
(x) = (1− a)
(
x
s
)n/(n−1)
The expectation of Z is
E[Z] = 1− (1− a)n +
∫ s
0
n
(
x
µn
) n
n−1
(n− 1) dx
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Hence, the expected value to the searcher of Z, uP,L, is
uP,L = 1− (1− a)n +
ns
(
s
µn
) n
n−1
2n− 1 (4)
5.1.2 The Case with Frictions
If there are frictions and µ ≥ 1− (1/n)1/(n−1), then Pandora’s expected payoff, uP,F , is
uP,F =
(
βµ− c) n−1∑
t=0
(
β(1− µ))t
=
(
βµ− c)1− (β(1− µ))n
1− β(1− µ)
(5)
The main result:
Theorem 5.1. Fix a binary prior with mean µ > 0. Then, for any number of boxes n
such that µ ≥ 1 − (1/n)1/(n−1), there exists a discount factor βˆ < 1 and a search cost
cˆ > 0 such that if β > βˆ and c < cˆ, Pandora obtains a higher discounted expected utility
from the case with frictions. If n is finite, the frictionless case can lead to strictly higher
utility for Pandora.
Proof. With frictions, the discounted expected utility of Pandora’s search is given by
Expression 5. As β → 1 and c → 0, Expression 5 converges to the expected value of
the first order statistic of G0, i.e. the expected value of the maximum of n draws from
distribution G0:
uP,F = 1−
(
1− µ)n
In the frictionless case, each box will choose the strategy described in Theorem 3.2,
which for finite n is Fi 6= G0, Fi ∈M(µ). Recall, from Expression 4, the expected value
to the searcher is given by:
uP,L = 1− (1− a)n +
ns
(
s
µn
) n
n−1
2n− 1
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Figure 2: Effect of n on Pandora’s Welfare, for µ = 1/3 and β = 1
This is strictly increasing in a, and for finite n, a < µ. Thus we must have uP,L <
1 − (1 − µ)n = uP,F . Finally, since Expression 5 is smooth and strictly increasing in β
and decreasing in c, the result follows.
In Figure 2 we illustrate this dynamic for small n and an expected reward of µ = 1/3.8
We have shown that regardless of how many boxes there are, it is welfare improving
to the searcher to be slightly impatient and/or have a small search cost. This slight cost
leads to the “perfect competition” in information provision.
Because Pandora’s search is directed, it becomes important for the boxes to choose
a signal that entices Pandora to visit them first. Crucially, this choice occurs before
Pandora commences her search, and this, in tandem with the search cost, forces the
boxes to compete on information.
8Note that in [10] the authors define a partial order ≤e as
FX ≤e FY ⇔ EX(n) ≤ EY(n)
(
∀n ≥ 1
)
They then show (Theorem 2.2 [10]) that FX c FY implies FX ≤e FY . However, here we do not use
this result since we show a strict inequality.
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6 Discussion
In this paper we look at the problem of information provision in a sequential, directed
search setting. With frictions, the choice of whom to visit first becomes paramount to
the searcher. Each box, all else equal, would prefer to be visited first, and this affects
its choice of signal. With frictions, as long as the expected value of the prize µ is
sufficiently high, the unique equilibrium is one in which each box chooses a signal that
is fully informative. This can be contrasted with the unique equilibrium in the case
without frictions, which, for finite n, is never fully informative. The searcher, Pandora,
naturally prefers more informative signals, and so as long as the costs are sufficiently
low, she counter-intuitively prefers the case with frictions (see Figure 2).
One alternative insight or interpretation of the results in this paper is that consumers
gain when sellers are forced to compete on order. Another way this effect could be derived
is by considering equilibria that are not fair. If in the frictionless case Pandora is allowed
to choose to visit more informative boxes first (violating the fairness assumption), then
competition on order will arise, and boxes will be completely informative. However, as
we show in this paper, search frictions provide this impetus, even when Pandora’s search
policy must be completely fair.
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A Appendix (Section 2 Proofs)
A.1 Theorem 2.8 Proof
Proof. In this proof, we show equilibrium existence for a general prior, and not just one
supported on two points. Because of that, the set of strategies is F(G0), the set of all
mean preserving contractions of the prior. If the prior is binary, F(G0) = M(µ). We
first prove the following proposition:
Proposition A.1. For each box i, the set of pure strategies, F(G0), and the set of mixed
strategies, Σi, are compact, convex and Hausdorff.
Proof. Our proof proceeds through a series of Lemmata. First, from Elton and Hill
(1993) [13], we have
Remark A.2. The set of fusions of G0, F(G0), is closed with respect to the weak-*
topology.
Moreover,
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Lemma A.3. (Theorem 3.11 in [13]) F(G0) is convex.
Using these results, we have
Lemma A.4. The pure strategy set for a box i, F(G0), is compact (with respect to the
weak-* topology) and convex. Moreover, the Cartesian product of the pure strategy sets,∏
iF(G0), is compact and convex.
Proof. From Lemma A.3, F(G0) is convex. Denote by M(Θ) the set of all Borel prob-
ability measures on a compact set Θ. If G0 is a probability measure on Θ, then
F(G0) ⊆ M(Θ). Using the Riesz Representation theorem one can show that M(Θ)
is weak-* compact. By construction, F(G0) is closed and since it is a subset of M(Θ) it
must therefore be compact.
Convexity of the Cartesian product of the pure strategy sets,
∏
iF(G0), is immediate.
Moreover, by Tychonoff’s theorem,
∏
iF(G0) is compact.
Since the weak-* topology is a Hausdorff space, we have
Lemma A.5. The pure strategy set for a box i, F(G0), is Hausdorff.
Moreover,
Lemma A.6. The set of mixed strategies, Σi, is compact, convex and Hausdorff.
Proof. By construction, Σi is convex. Denote by F
i the product set of box i’s pure
strategies. F i is endowed with the product topology and the product sigma-algebra. By
Tychonoff’s theorem, we may immediately conclude that F i is compact (with respect to
the product topology). Then, let M(F i) be the set of all Borel probability distributions
on F i. Again, by the Riesz Representation theorem, this set is weak-* compact.
Naturally, Σ :=
∏
i Σi is also compact, convex, and Hausdorff.
Armed with these results, to prove Theorem 2.8, we use results developed in Reny
(1999) [26].
By assumption, ui is bounded and measurable. From Lemma A.5, the set of strategies
F(G0) is Hausdorff. In the terminology of [26], this game is a compact, Hausdorff
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game. The set of Borel probability measures on F(G0) is itself compact in the weak-*
topology. Moreover, from Proposition 5.1 in [26], the mixed extension of the game G,
G¯, is reciprocally upper semicontinuous. Next, we show the following Lemma
Lemma A.7. For each of a box’s pure strategies, its payoff is lower-semicontinuous in
its opponents’ mixed strategies.
Proof. For expository purposes, we first illustrate the proof for the two box game, which
is much simpler; likewise through symmetry, we may focus on box 1 without loss. Let
box 1 choose F ∈ F(G0) and box 2 choose G ∈ F(G0). It is clear that box 1’s payoff is
not lower-semicontinuous in box 2’s pure strategies. We wish to show that for each of
box 1’s pure strategies, its payoff is lower-semicontinuous in the mixed strategies of box
2.
First, note that the set of pure strategies is set F(G0), which is a subset of the set
of probability measures on the metric space
(
[0, 1], | · |) with mean µ. The set of pure
strategies is equipped with the weak-∗ topology, and correspondingly is endowed with
the Le´vy-Prokhorov metric, which is defined as follows. For any subset A ⊆ [0, 1] define
the -neighborhood, A, of A as
A :=
{
p ∈ [0, 1] : ∃q ∈ A, |p− q| < }
Then, for any Borel probability measures µ, η ∈ ∆([0, 1]), the Le´vy-Prokhorov met-
ric, pi(µ, η) is defined as
pi(µ, η) := inf
{
 > 0|µ(A) ≤ η(A) +  and η(A) ≤ µ(A) + ,∀A ∈ B([0, 1])}
The set of mixed strategies is, in turn, the set of probability measures on the metric
space
(
F(G0), pi(·, ·)
)
, which is also equipped with the weak-∗ topology and endowed
with the Le´vy-Prokhorov metric. For the sake of completeness, we write this out. For
any subset Q ⊆ F(G0), define the ε-neighborhood, Qε, of Q as
Qε :=
{
µ ∈ F(G0) : ∃η ∈ Q, pi(µ, η) < ε
}
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Then, for any Borel probability measures τ, ζ ∈ ∆(F(G0)), the Le´vy-Prokhorov
metric, ‖τ − ζ‖ is defined as
‖τ − ζ‖ := inf {ε > 0|τ(Q) ≤ ζ(Qε) + ε and ζ(Q) ≤ τ(Qε) + ε,∀Q ∈ B(F(G0))}
Next, we write out box 1’s payoff function explicitly: Suppose box 1 chooses distri-
bution F and box 2 distribution G. Then, box 1’s payoff is:
If zF > zG,
Υ> = (1− F (zG)) +
∫ zG
0
G(x)dF (x)
If zF < zG,
Υ< = G(zF )(1− F (zF )) +
∫ zF
0
G(x)dF (x)
If zF = zG = z,
Υ= =
1
2
Υ< +
1
2
Υ>
Let box 2 choose mixed strategy φ over distributions (which has a point mass of
weight k ≥ 0 on zF ). Then, box 1’s payoff from a pure strategy F is
u1(F, φ) =
∫
Φ<
Υ<dφ(G) +
∫
Φ>
Υ>dφ(G) +
∫
Φ=
Υ=dφ(G)
where Φ< is the set of distributions in the support of φ that induce a zG > zF and
similarly for Φ> and Φ=. u1(F, φ0) is given analogously. We take the difference and
u1(F, φ0)− u1(F, φ) is
∫
Φ<
Υ<(dφ0(G)− dφ(G)) +
∫
Φ>
Υ>(dφ0(G)− dφ(G)) +
∫
Φ=
Υ=(dφ0(G)− dφ(G)))
(A1)
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Clearly, Υ<, Υ>, and Υ= are each less than 1. Hence, if ‖φ − φ0‖ < ε/3 then
Expression A1 is itself less than ε. The result (for two boxes) is shown. Furthermore, it
is easy to see how this result generalizes to n boxes.
Write Ξ0 and Ξ as the vectors of mixed strategies for the n − 1 boxes other than
box 1. Under this vector of mixed strategies, there are a finite number of permutations,
I ∈ N, of the realized orderings of z values. Index each permutation by a unique i,
1 ≤ i ≤ I, and define Φi in the same manner as in the two box case. Additionally, for
each i, write box 1’s payoff as Υi. Thus, u1(F,Ξ0)− u1(F,Ξ) is
∑
i∈I
∫
Φi
Υi ·
(
dΞ0(F )− dΞ(F )
)
which is less than ε if ‖Ξ− Ξ0‖ < ε/I.
It is immediately clear that lower-semicontinuity in the opponents’ mixed strategies
for each of a box’s pure strategies implies payoff security on the set of mixed strategies.
Then, since G¯ is payoff secure and reciprocally usc, by Corollary 5.2 in [26] it is better-
reply secure, and therefore, also by Corollary 5.2, G must have a mixed strategy Nash
Equilibrium.
B Appendix (Section 3 Proofs)
B.1 Proposition 3.1
Proof. First, we establish the following lemma:
Lemma B.1. There are no symmetric Nash Equilibria where boxes choose discrete dis-
tributions supported on N(<∞) points.
Proof. It is easy to see that there is no symmetric equilibrium in which each box chooses
a distribution consisting of a single point mass. Such a distribution could only consist
of distribution with weight 1 placed on µ and would yield to each box a payoff of 1/n.
However, there is a profitable deviation for a box to instead place weight 1−  on µ+ η
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and weight  on 0 (, η > 0). In doing so, this box could achieve a payoff arbitrarily close
to 1.
Now, assume∞ > N ≥ 2. Observe that a strategy consists of a choice of probabilities{
p1, p2, . . . , pN
}
, pi ∈ [0, 1] ∀i,
∑N
i=1 pi = 1 and support a1 < a2 < · · · < aN ∈
[0, 1] such that
∑N
i=1 aipi = µ.
The expected payoff to each box from playing an arbitrary strategy, S1 = S2 = · · · =
Sn = E, is
ui(Si, S−i) =
N−1∑
j=0
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
1
m− ip
n−i
N−j
(
N−j−1∑
k=1
pk
)i
We claim deviating to the following strategy is profitable: S ′1 where a
′
N = aN is
played with probability pN −  and a′j = aj + η is played with probability pj + j, for
j 6= N , where ∑N−1j j =  (Again, , η, j > 0 ∀j).9 The expected payoff to box 1
playing strategy S ′1 is
u1(S
′
1, S−1) =
N−1∑
j=0
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
1
n− ip
n−i
N−j
(
N−j∑
k=1
pk
)i
− 
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
1
n− ip
n−i−1
N (1− pN)i
+
N−1∑
j=1
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
n− i− 1
n− i p
n−i
N−j
(
N−j∑
k=1
pk
)i
Note that the deviation is profitable for box 1 if

n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
1
n− ip
n−i−1
N (1− pN)i <
N−1∑
j=1
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
n− i− 1
n− i p
n−i
N−j
(
N−j∑
k=1
pk
)i ,
Which holds for a sufficiently small vector (1, ..., N−1).
Then, we extend this lemma to show that there can be no distributions with point
masses on any point in [0, 1). Using an analogous argument to that used in Lemma B.1,
9Note that we can always find such an η > 0.
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it is easy to see that there cannot be multiple point masses. Accordingly, it remains to
show that there cannot be a single point mass. First, we will show that there cannot be
an atom at any point b ∈ (0, 1). Suppose for the sake of contradiction that that there is
a symmetric equilibrium where each box plays a point mass of size p on point b. That
is, each box plays strategy S that consists of a distribution F and a point mass of size
p on point b. Let H(x) = F n−1. Then, box 1’s payoff is
u1(S1, S−1) =
∫ 1
0
∫ y
0
h(x)f(y)dxdy + p
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)(
1
n− i
)
F (b)ipn−1−i
Then, let box 1 deviate by introducing a tiny point mass of size  at 0 and moving
the other point mass to b + η and reducing its size slightly to p −  (, η > 0); call this
strategy S
′
1. The payoff to box 1 is
u1(S
′
1, S−1) =
∫ 1
0
∫ y
0
h(x)f(y)dxdy + (p− )
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
F (b+ η)ipn−1−i
Suppose that this is not a profitable deviation. This holds if and only if
p
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)(
1
n− i
)
F (b)ipn−1−i ≥ (p− )
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
F (b+ η)ipn−1−i
Or,
pn−1 + p
n−1∑
i=1
(
n− 1
i
)(
1
n− i
)
F (b)ipn−1−i
≥ n− 1
n
pn + (p− )
n−1∑
i=1
(
n− 1
i
)
F (b+ η)ipn−1−i
Clearly, as  and η go to zero we achieve a contradiction. Hence, there is a profitable
deviation and so this is not an equilibrium. It is clear that there cannot be an equilibrium
with a point mass on 0 and so we omit a proof.
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B.2 Theorem 3.2 Proof
We prove this theorem for the case where µ ≥ 1/n. The remaining case, µ < 1/n, is
proved analogously and the doubtful/incredulous reader is directed to the working paper
[19], which contains the detailed proof.
B.2.1 Equilibrium Existence
Proof. First, we show that this is an equilibrium. Accordingly, we need to show that
there can be no unilateral profitable deviation. Define Z as maxi 6=1 Xi, which, recall has
a point mass on 1. Moreover, define H as the corresponding continuous portion of the
distribution of Z; H := F n−1i :
H(z) = (1− a)n−1x
s
with associated density
h(z) =
(1− a)n−1
s
Evidently, it suffices to show that our candidate strategy achieves a payoff of at
least 1/n to the box who uses it, irrespective of the strategy choice by the other boxes.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is a profitable deviation, that is, box 1
deviates profitably by playing strategy G. Clearly, we can represent G as having a point
mass of size c, 0 ≤ c ≤ µ on 1 (naturally, if c = 0, then there is no point mass there).
Written out, G consists of
G(y) for x ∈ [0, 1) (G)
and Pr(Y = 1) = c. Define K :=
∫ 1
0
dG = 1 − c. Naturally, K ≤ 1. Then, box 1’s
utility from this deviation, u1(G, S−1), is10
10Note that the first term, c(1− (1− a)n)/na, is derived below, in the proof of Lemma 3.3.
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u1 = c
1− (1− a)n
na
+ (1− a)n−1(K −G(s))+ ∫ s
0
∫ y
0
h(x)g(y)dxdy
=
c
nµ
+ (1− a)n−1(K −G(s))+ ∫ s
0
∫ y
0
h(x)g(y)dxdy
Evidently, this is a profitable deviation if and only if u1 > 1/n; that is,
c
nµ
+ (1− a)n−1[K −G(s)]+ ∫ s
0
(1− a)n−1
s
yg(y)dy >
1
n
(B1)
Rearranging,
c
nµ
+ (1− a)n−1[K −G(s)]+ ∫ s
0
(1− a)n−1
s
yg(y)dy >
1
n
c− µ
nµ(1− a)n−1 +K +
∫ s
0
1
s
yg(y)dy > G(s)
c− µ
nµ(1− a)n−1 +K +
∫ 1
0
1
s
yg(y)dy > G(s) +
∫ 1
s
1
s
yg(y)dy
c− µ
nµ(1− a)n−1 +
µ− c
s
+K > G(s) +
∫ 1
s
1
s
yg(y)dy
K >
∫ 1
s
1
s
yg(y)dy +G(s)
where we used the fact that
∫ 1
0
(1/s)yg(y)dy = µ− c and s = nµ(1−a)n−1. It is clear
that
∫ 1
s
1
s
yg(y)dy ≥ ∫ 1
s
g(y)dy and thus we have
K >
∫ 1
s
1
s
yg(y)dy +G(s) ≥
∫ s
0
g(y)dy +
∫ 1
s
g(y)dy = K
We have established a contradiction and thus the result is shown.
B.2.2 Equilibrium Uniqueness
Proof. First, we tackle Lemma 3.3:
Lemma 3.3 Proof
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Let each box play strategy Si = S where they each put weight a on 1. Suppose that
box 1 deviates and plays strategy Sˆ1 consisting of random variable Y distributed with
value 1 with probability µ and 0 with probability 1− µ.
Then, box 1’s payoff is
u1(Sˆ1, S−1) = µ
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)(
1
n− i
)
(1− a)ian−1−i (B2)
We use Claim B.2 (proved infra) and write B2 as
u1(Sˆ1, S−1) = µ
1− (1− a)n
na
(B3)
This must be less than or equal to 1/n:
1
n
≥ µ1− (1− a)
n
na
a ≥ µ[1− (1− a)n]
Claim B.2.
µ
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)(
1
n− i
)
(1− a)ian−1−i = µ1− (1− a)
n
na
Proof. First, define k := n− 1− i and so we have
µ
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)(
1
n− i
)
(1− a)ian−1−i = µ(1− a)n−1
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
1
k + 1
(
a
1− a
)k
Then, we have the identity.
n∑
k=0
1
k + 1
(
n
k
)
zk =
(z + 1)n+1 − 1
(n+ 1)z
and so we simply set z := a
1−a , and after some algebra the proof is completed. 
There must also be a continuous portion of the distribution on some interval [t, s]
with t ≥ 0, s ≤ 1. Accordingly, our candidate equilibrium strategy, Fi, is of the following
form
35
Fi =

0 x ∈ [0, t)
Fi x ∈ [t, s)
1− a x = s
(Fi)
with 0 ≤ t < s ≤ 1 and Pr(X = 1) = a.11
We look for a symmetric equilibrium. Observe that distributions Fi must be such
that
∫ s
t
xfi(x)dx = µ− a
Fix Fj for j 6= i and define H as F n−1j . Given this distribution, we have the necessary
condition that Fi maximizes
1− (1− a)n
n
+
∫ s
t
fi(x)H(x)dx
Next, we define the functional J [f ] as the Euler-Lagrange equation
J [fi] =
∫ s
t
fi(x)H(x)dx− λ0
[ ∫ s
t
fi(x)dx− (1− a)
]
− λ
[ ∫ s
t
xfi(x)dx− µ+ a
]
and take the functional derivative,
δJ(f(x))
δf(x)
= H(x)− λ0 − λx
This must equal 0 at a maximum, so we have,
H(x) = λ0 + λx
Then, by symmetry, H(·) = F n−1i (·). Moreover, we have two initial conditions that
allow us to obtain t and s. Using the conditions Fi(t) = 0 and Fi(s) = (1 − a), the
equilibrium distribution, Fi, must be
11It is clear that the weight on 1, a, cannot be µ in the symmetric equilibrium. To see this, note
that such a value for a would beget a distribution with binary support, which we already ruled out in
Lemma B.1.
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Fi(x) = (1− a)
(
x− t
s− t
)1/(n−1)
with the corresponding pdf,
fi(x) =
1
x− t
(
1− a
n− 1
)(
x− t
s− t
)1/(n−1)
Note that we also need
∫ s
t
xfi(x)dx = µ− a, which reduces to
a =
nµ− [s+ (n− 1)t]
n− [s+ (n− 1)t] (B4)
We now show that t must be 0:
Lemma B.3. The lower bound of the continuous portion of the distribution, t, must be
0.
and pin down the size of the weight on 1:
Lemma B.4. The weight on 1, a, is given by a = µ− µ(1− a)n.
Proof. We push the detailed proofs for Lemmata B.3 and B.4 further back in the paper,
to Appendix D.1, since they are rather tedious and mechanical.
C Appendix (Section 3 Proofs)
C.1 Lemma C.1 Proof
For the sake of completeness, we prove the following lemma, which is mentioned in the
text (but ultimately not used in the proof of Theorem 4.1). Note that we establish this
result for a general prior.
Lemma C.1. The reservation value assigned by P to a box with a fully revealing signal
is weakly higher than the reservation value assigned to a box with any other signal.
Equivalently, if Fi ∈ F(G0) then zG0 ≥ zFi.
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Proof. Let Fi be any fusion of G0: Fi ∈ F(G0). Recall that this is equivalent to
saying that G0 is a mean-preserving spread of Fi, or that Fi second-order stochastically
dominates G0. Equivalently, for all s ∈ [0, 1],
∫ s
0
Fi(x)dx ≤
∫ s
0
G0(x)dx
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that zFi > zG0 . First, we write
c = β
∫ 1
zFi
(x− zFi)dFi(x)− (1− β)zFi
c = β
∫ 1
zG0
(x− zG0)dG0(x)− (1− β)zG0
We allow for a and b to be point-masses on 0 under distributions Fi and G0, re-
spectively. Note that since G0 is a mean preserving spread of Fi, we must have b ≥ a.
Then,
β
∫ 1
zFi
(x− zFi)dFi(x)− (1− β)zFi = β
∫ 1
zG0
(x− zG0)dG0(x)− (1− β)zG0
and since zFi > zG0 ,
β
∫ 1
zFi
(x− zFi)dFi(x)− (1− β)zFi > β
∫ 1
zFi
(x− zFi)dG0(x)− (1− β)zFi∫ 1
zFi
(x− zFi)dFi(x) >
∫ 1
zFi
(x− zFi)dG0(x)
Or,
∫ 1
0
(x− zFi)dFi(x) + azFi −
∫ zFi
0
(x− zFi)dFi(x)
>
∫ 1
0
(x− zFi)dG0(x) + bzFi −
∫ zFi
0
(x− zFi)dG0(x)∫ 1
0
(x− zFi)dFi(x) + azFi − azFi +
∫ zFi
0
Fi(x)dx
>
∫ 1
0
(x− zFi)dG0(x) + bzFi − bzFi +
∫ zFi
0
G0(x)dx
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Because G0 is a mean preserving spread of Fi, this implies
∫ 1
0
(x− zFi)dFi(x) +
∫ zFi
0
Fi(x)dx >
∫ 1
0
(x− zFi)dG0(x) +
∫ zFi
0
Fi(x)dx∫ 1
0
(x− zFi)dFi(x) >
∫ 1
0
(x− zFi)dG0(x)
zFi(1− b) > zFi(1− a)
Finally, since G0 is a mean preserving spread of Fi, we must have 1 − a ≥ 1 − b.
Thus, we have established a contradiction and so we conclude that zG0 ≥ zFi .
C.2 Ternary Support Example
Suppose n = 2 and that the prior, G0, consists of a discrete distribution with weight .4
on 1, .3 on .5, and .3 on 0. Let β = 1 and c = .1. Then the reservation value induced
by the prior zG0 = −.1 + .6zG0 + .4 = .75
Consider now the reservation value induced by the discrete distribution, Hi with
weight .4 on 1, .15 on .5, .3 on .25, and .15 on 0. Hence, zHi = −.1 + .6zHi + .4 = .75. In
fact, it is clear that any distribution Fi ∈ F(G0) with weight .4 on 1 induces the same
(maximal) z.
C.3 Theorem 4.4 Proof
Proof. First, a lemma:
Lemma C.2. There is no pure strategy equilibrium in which boxes play distributions
with any zFi < zG0.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is such an equilibrium. Each box
plays strategy Fi ∈ M(µ), Fi 6= G0. For convenience we may drop the subscript and
define distribution H := F n−1(x). Box i’s payoff is given by
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ui =
1
n
[
1− F (zF ) +
∫ zF
0
H(x)dF (x)
]
+
1
n
[
F (zF )
(
1− F (zF )
)
+
∫ zF
0
H(x)dF (x)
]
+ · · ·+ 1
n
[
F (zF )
n−1
(
1− F (zF )
)
+
∫ zF
0
H(x)dF (x)
]
Or,
ui =
1
n
(
1− F (zF )
) n−1∑
t=0
F (zF )
t +
∫ zF
0
H(x)dF (x)
Suppose that box j deviates by increasing the weight placed on 1 by , removing
weight γ =
∫ η
0
dF (x), η < zF ; and increasing the weight placed on 0 by ρ, with +ρ = γ
and  =
∫ η
0
xdF (x).12 Call this strategy Fˆ . Through similar logic to that used in Lemma
4.2, supra, zFˆ > zF . Box i’s expected payoff from this deviation, uˆi, is
uˆi = 1− Fˆ (zF ) +
∫ zF
0
H(x)dFˆ (x)
Then, as η, , ρ→ 0, uˆi − ui converges to
(
1− F (zF )
)(
1− 1
n
n−1∑
t=0
F (zF )
t
)
> 0
Thus, box i has a profitable deviation by choosing sufficiently small η,  and ρ.
From Lemma 4.2, we see that the uniquely maximal reservation value assigned to
a box is that induced by a fully informative signal. Furthermore, Lemma C.2 dictates
that the symmetric pure strategy equilibrium must consist of distributions that induce
the maximal reservation value. Thus we conclude that the symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium is one where each box chooses the prior distribution G0. Then, we see that
there is also a profitable deviation from this strategy profile. Since (1 − µ)n−1 > 1/n,
a deviation to a completely uninformative strategy, µ with probability 1, obtains box
12This is always possible unless all of the weight of F is above zF . However, if all of the weight of F
were above zF then zF would be minimized, and there is obviously no equilibrium in which each box
chooses a distribution that induces the minimal z.
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i an expected payoff of (1 − µ)n−1 > 1/n and we conclude that there is no symmetric
equilibrium in pure strategies.
C.4 Proposition 4.5 Proof
First we establish the following Lemma:
Lemma C.3. Any pure strategy is equivalent to a strategy in which the portion of the
distribution above zFi consists of a single point mass on some point mi > zFi.
Proof. Consider any distribution Fi ∈ M(µ). Suppose that the portion of Fi above z
consists of a single point mass on z itself of weight p. Then, we have
z(1− F (z)) = −c+ pz
zp = −c+ pz
which is obviously a contradiction. Hence, if the equilibrium distribution has a point
mass on a point greater than z, it must be on a point strictly greater than z. Then,
suppose there is an equilibrium where both boxes choose some arbitrary distribution Hi.
Define p :=
∫ 1
z
dHi(x) and
m := EHi
[
X|X ≥ z] = ∫ 1z xdHi(x)∫ 1
z
dHi(x)
Define a new distribution Hˆi(z) as a distribution consisting of a point mass of weight
p on m and a continuous portion equal to Hi on [0, z]. Clearly, mp =
∫ 1
z
xdHi(x) and
since Hˆi(z) = Hi(z), this distribution achieves the same z. Moreover, since p = 1−Hi(z),
this distribution must also be an equilibrium.
Note that Pandora’s search policy dictates that she stop if the highest remaining
reservation value is less than the highest realized (expected) value obtained from a box.
If a box k is visited then the remaining zFi ’s for the so-far unvisited boxes as well as
the realized (expected) values obtained from the boxes already visited must be less than
zk. Accordingly, if the realization for box k is higher than zk then Pandora will stop
searching and select box k.
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Lastly, note that for all pairs z, F (x) there is a unique m corresponding to that
pair.
And now Proposition 4.5:
Proof. As a result of Lemma C.3, we can restrict the set of pure strategies (and set of
support for the mixed strategies) to those distributions with a single point mass above
the z induced by the distribution. That is, a box’s pure strategy has a point mass of
weight pi on some mi > zFi .
Armed with this lemma, we may now prove the proposition through contradiction.
Suppose that there is a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which there is positive
measure induced on some zˆ < zmax. That is, with probability q > 0 a box chooses a
distribution with reservation value zˆ. Then, with probability qn > 0 each box chooses
a distribution with the same reservation value. Define ai := EΓ[pi|z = zˆ] (where Γ is
the mixed strategy distribution over pure strategies) and note that since we are consid-
ering symmetric equilibria we may drop the subscript. Box i’s payoff in this proposed
equilibrium is
ui = q
n
[
1
n
(a+ ζ) +
1
n
(a(1− a) + ζ) + · · ·+ 1
n
(a(1− a)n−1 + ζ)
]
+ Ψ + Υ
= qn
[
1
n
a+
1
n
(
a(1− a))+ · · ·+ 1
n
(
a(1− a)n−1)+ ζ]+ Ψ + Υ
where ζ is box i’s expected payoff when no box obtains a realization greater than zˆ,
given that each realization of the mixed strategy chosen by each box is some distribution
that induces zˆ, Ψ is the sum of box i’s expected payoffs in the instances where only 1,
2,...,n − 2 of the other boxes’ mixed strategy realizations is/are some distribution that
induces zˆ, and Υ is box i’s expected payoff when no box’s mixed strategy realization is
any distribution that induces zˆ.
Now, suppose that box i deviates and instead chooses a mixed strategy that has a
positive measure q induced on some zˆ + , where zˆ < zˆ +  < zmax and is otherwise
identical to the original mixed strategy. Moreover, suppose that each distribution in the
support of the mixed strategy that induces zˆ +  is a distribution obtained by adding
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weight η to m and ρ to 0 and excising some portion of the nonzero portion of the
distribution (below zˆ)13 from a distribution in the support of the mixed strategy that
induces zˆ in the original proposed equilibrium.
As η → 0 (and thus → 0), box i’s payoff will converge to u′i = qn(a+ζ)+Ψ′+Υ > ui
since a > a/n+ (1/n)
(
a(1− a))+ · · ·+ (1/n)(a(1− a)n−1) and analogously Ψ′ > Ψ. We
have established a profitable deviation.
D Appendix
D.1 Lemma B.3 Proof
Proof. Let boxes 2 through n play Fi supported on [t, s] and have a point mass of size
a on 1. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that t > 0. Recall,
Fi(x) = (1− a)
(
x− t
s− t
)1/(n−1)
Thus, the cdf of the maximum of this, H := F n−1, is
H(x) = (1− a)n−1
(
x− t
s− t
)
and
h(x) = (1− a)n−1
(
1
s− t
)
Let box 1 play some alternate strategy G supported on [0, s] such that the density
is positive on some portion of [0, t] and have a point mass of size a on 1. Then, box 1’s
expected payoff is:
13Done in such a way that the resulting distribution induces zˆ + .
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u =
1− (1− a)n
n
+
∫ s
t
∫ y
t
h(x)g(y)dxdy
=
1− (1− a)n
n
+
∫ s
t
(1− a)n−1
(
y
s− t
)
g(y)dy −
∫ s
t
(1− a)n−1
(
t
s− t
)
g(y)dy
=
1− (1− a)n
n
+
∫ s
0
(1− a)n−1
(
y
s− t
)
g(y)dy −
∫ t
0
(1− a)n−1
(
y
s− t
)
g(y)dy
−
∫ s
0
(1− a)n−1
(
t
s− t
)
g(y)dy +
∫ t
0
(1− a)n−1
(
t
s− t
)
g(y)dy
=
1− (1− a)n
n
+
∫ s
0
(1− a)n−1
(
y
s− t
)
g(y)dy −
∫ s
0
(1− a)n−1
(
t
s− t
)
g(y)dy
−
∫ t
0
(1− a)n−1
(
y
s− t
)
g(y)dy +
∫ t
0
(1− a)n−1
(
t
s− t
)
g(y)dy
=
1
n
+
∫ t
0
(1− a)n−1
(
t− y
s− t
)
g(y)dy >
1
n
where we used,
1− (1− a)n
n
+
∫ s
0
(1− a)n−1
(
y
s− t
)
g(y)dy −
∫ s
0
(1− a)n−1
(
t
s− t
)
g(y)dy
=
1− (1− a)n
n
+ (1− a)n−1
(
µ− a
s− t
)
− (1− a)n
(
t
s− t
) (D1)
Too see this, observe that we can find µ− a explicitly. It is,
µ− a =
∫ s
t
yf(y)dy
=
∫ s
t
y
y − t
(
1− a
n− 1
)(
y − t
s− t
)1/(n−1)
dy
=
(1− a) (y − t) 1n−1 (y + (n− 1) t)
n (s− t) 1n−1
∣∣∣∣∣
s
t
=
(1− a) (s+ (n− 1) t)
n
Substituting this into D1, we obtain
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1− (1− a)n
n
+ (1− a)n−1
(
µ− a
s− t
)
− (1− a)n
(
t
s− t
)
=
1− (1− a)n
n
+ (1− a)n
(
(s+ (n− 1) t)
n(s− t)
)
− (1− a)n
(
t
s− t
)
=
1− (1− a)n
n
+ (1− a)n
(
(s+ (n− 1) t− nt)
n(s− t)
)
=
1− (1− a)n
n
+ (1− a)n
(
s− t
n(s− t)
)
=
1
n
Thus, there is a profitable deviation and so t must equal 0.
D.2 Lemma B.4 Proof
Proof. Recall that in Lemma 3.3 we show that a ≥ µ− µ(1− a)n. Thus, it is sufficient
to show here that a ≤ µ− µ(1− a)n.
We divide the following into two cases. In the first case, suppose that µ ≤ s. Note
that it cannot be a profitable deviation for a box to play a strategy consisting of s played
with probability µ/s and 0 with probability 1−µ/s. This condition is equivalent to D2:
1
n
≥ (1− a)
n−1µ
s
(D2)
Or,
s ≥ n(1− a)n−1µ (D3)
From B4, and using the fact that t = 0, we have
a =
nµ− s
n− s
Or,
s =
n(µ− a)
(1− a) (D4)
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We substitute this into D3 and obtain
n(µ− a)
(1− a) ≥ n(1− a)
n−1µ
µ− µ(1− a)n ≥ a
For the second case, suppose now that µ > s. By similar logic to the above, it
cannot be a profitable deviation for a box to play a strategy consisting of s played with
probability (1− µ)/(1− s) and 1 with probability (µ− s)/(1− s). That is,
1
n
≥
(
1− µ
1− s
)
(1− a)n−1 +
(
µ− s
1− s
)(
1− (1− a)n
na
)
(D5)
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that a > µ − µ(1 − a)n. Additionally, for
convenience, define k := (1− a)n. D5 can be rearranged to obtain:
s
(
1− k − a) ≥ an(1− µ) k
(1− a) + µ(1− k)− a
We substitute D4 and rearrange to obtain:
n(µ− a)(1− k − a) ≥ ank(1− µ) + µ(1− k)(1− a)− a(1− a)
µ
(
n+ a− an− 1)− (1− a)a(n− 1) ≥ µk((n− 1)(1− a)) (D6)
Our assumption above that a > µ − µ(1 − a)n is equivalent to µk > µ − a. We
substitute this into D6 and cancel:
µ
(
n+ a− an− 1)− (1− a)a(n− 1) ≥ µk((n− 1)(1− a))
µ
(
n+ a− an− 1)− (1− a)a(n− 1) > (µ− a)((n− 1)(1− a))
0 > 0
We have achieved a contradiction and have thereby shown that a ≥ µ − µ(1 − a)n.
This, combined with Lemma 3.3 allows us to conclude the result, that a = µ−µ(1−a)n.
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